

146/148/DDH Seminar




19 NOVEMBER 2020


Welcome



Jason Ashworth - Certification Manager, Aircraft and Product



CAA Restructure in July 2020





Shelley Turner
Acting CEO and Director of
Civil Aviation

Dean Winter
Acting DCE Aviation Safety



John Kay
DCE System and Practice
Design



John Kay
Acting DCE Organisational
Development and Support

Chris Ford
DCE Aviation Security and
Infrastructure




Cathy Robinson
Acting DCE Performance
Monitoring and Assurance





Dean Winter
Acting DCE Aviation
Safety



Jason Ashworth
Certification Manager,
Aircraft and Products

David Gill
Team Leader, Aircraft
Inspection &
Registration

Greg Baum
Team Leader, Product
Certification

Rebecca Langton
Emerging Technology
Programme Manager

Gary Leach
Airworthiness Inspector

Owen Olls
Airworthiness Inspector

Kavita Vanmari
Certification Engineer

Charlie Morris
Certification Engineer

VACANT
Certification Engineer
(Systems)

VACANT
Airworthiness Inspector

John Marshall
Airworthiness Inspector

Gaetano Settineri
Certification Engineer

Phillip Scanlan
Certification Engineer

Robyn Evans
Aircraft Registrar

Judi Fuller
Aircraft Registrar
(0.5 FTE)


Glen Somerville
Certification Engineer

Lino Miguel
Certification Engineer


Tim Dutton
Flight Test Engineer

Rens Molenaar
Certification Engineer





How the new structure affects you as a DDH / Part 146 / Part 148



Central application point for certification activities: certification@caa.govt.nz

You may see new names & faces at team leader / management level BUT you will likely interact on activities with familiar people.

E.g. an audit may be managed and led by a different auditor, but you'll likely see a Product Certification Engineer on the audit team


Broadly-speaking the Certification function is grouped into the following :

Aircraft-facing:	Certification Unit, Aircraft & Products	- TCs, STCs, Mods, CofA, CofR
Organisation-facing:	Certification Unit, Organisations	- 146/148 certification, amendment
People-facing:	Licensing and Standards	- Test Pilot Approvals


EXCEPT for Design Delegation Holders

Product Certification Team retains overall responsibility for approval of DDHs


COVID-19 and the impact on us




Stats



Stats




What are the risks to aviation now, and what will they be during recovery?




146/148 Certification



Jon Mayne - Team Leader 145/146/147/148/19F





Organisation Certification:


- **12 - Part 146 Design Organisation (7 SMS certified)**
- **13 - Part 148 Manufacturing Organisation (8 SMS certified)**
- **53 - Part 145 Maintenance Organisations**
- **4 - Part 147 Maintenance Training Organisations**
- **157 - Part 119 Operators**
- **103 - Part 137 Agricultural Operators**
- **23 - Part 19F Supply Organisations**

Monitoring and Inspection



Steve Kern - Manager Monitoring and Inspection








14
500
700
5400

Risk-based, intelligence-led




“Turning the 2024 vision into reality will require focus on being smarter and more effective in everything we do and be willing to transform how we work in a risk-based, intelligence-led organisation.”

(Statement of Intent)



Risk-based, intelligence-led



Priorities



Regulatory Operating Model

9 February 2014

Regulatory Operating Model
Page 1 of 6

Regulatory Operating Model

- Purpose and scope
- Authority
- References
- Scope Statement
- Overarching Regulatory Principles
- CAA Approach
- Providing a Report Culture
- Considerations Taken into Account in Regulating the System
- Life Cycle Approach to Regulation in the Civil Aviation System
- Nature of the Activity Conducted
- Risk Assessment
- Attitudes and Behaviour Critical to Safety Performance
- Regulatory Toolkit

Document Change History
This Change History log contains a record of changes made to this document:

Release Date	Version	Section / Nature of Change
17 Feb 2012	1.0	New policy created to identify the regulatory principles and approach the CAA adopts in discharging its obligations.
5 Feb 2014	2.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. d. 7: correction of typographical error in the 'out' bullet point of paragraph 9 b. 8: Clarification of the safety performance pyramid, including an updated Figure 4.

2020 Strategic Priorities



Focus Areas – Work Programmes

**CIVIL AVIATION
AUTHORITY**

2019-2021
Safety and Security Focus Area
Work Programme

Surveillance Policy

11 November 2010

Level 2 - Executive Management Policies
CAA (Amended) Policy
Page 1 of 20

Civil Aviation Authority Surveillance Policy

1. Purpose and scope

2. Authority

3. References

4. Scope Statement

5. Overarching Regulatory Principles

6. CAA Approach

7. Providing a Report Culture

8. Considerations Taken into Account in Regulating the System

9. Life Cycle Approach to Regulation in the Civil Aviation System

10. Nature of the Activity Conducted

11. Risk Assessment

12. Attitudes and Behaviour Critical to Safety Performance

13. Regulatory Toolkit

Sector Risk Profiles

"Making Safe Aviation Even Safer"

Civil Aviation Authority Sector Risk Profile of Part 135 Helicopter and Small Aeroplane Operations

Final Report Updated May 2019

International agreements and arrangements

New Zealand has agreements and arrangements in place with other countries and international bodies. These arrangements help us work together to improve the safety and security of the global aviation system.

RSMS

01 November 2012

TERMS OF REFERENCE
CAA REGULATORY SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (RSMS)

Introduction

Background

Objectives

Scope

Key Deliverables

Timeline

Approval

Review


Interventions

Intervention Brief: Fixed-Wing Flight Training

OCTOBER 15, 2020

Prepared by Charlotte Rogers

Priorities



Desktop review of documents e.g. post certification validation

Sampling of returns from participants e.g. F337s

Structured conversations e.g. COVID-19 calls

Formal interviews – remote recorded conversations

Participant surveys

Certification


Programmed on-site audits

Programmed on-site spot checks

Sector or issue focused on-site spot checks

Operational checks e.g. BFERs and enroute checks

Field observations and intelligence gathering




CAA TOOLBOX

Review and looking forward



Greg Baum – Team Leader Product Certification





Responsibilities

Design Approvals: TC, STC, Mod, TSO, PMA

Design Validation: Acceptance of TC, technical data & specifications

Design Delegation Holders: New, renewal, monitoring


Support to 146/148 certification, monitoring & inspection

Support to 102 initial airworthiness (UAS)


PBN approval for Part 91, input to Part 119 operators

Collaboration: Bilaterals, ASTM, EUROCAE, SAE

Stats



Stats



International Engagement



IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES

FOR
AIRWORTHINESS

COVERING

DESIGN APPROVAL, PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES,
EXPORT AIRWORTHINESS APPROVAL,
POST DESIGN APPROVAL ACTIVITIES, AND
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN AUTHORITIES

Under the Agreement between
The Government of the United States of America
and
The Government of New Zealand
For The Promotion of Aviation Safety

REVISION B

December 4, 2015



WORKING ARRANGEMENT ON AIRWORTHINESS
BETWEEN
THE EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY (EASA)
AND
THE CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY
OF NEW ZEALAND (CAA-NZ)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "J. D.", is located at the bottom left of the EASA document page.

Part 23

14 CFR 23 amendment 64 / CS-23 amendment 5



- FAA & EASA means of compliance are different
- Must use FAA/EASA means of compliance – identify Part 23 paragraph and MoC on PSCP/Compliance matrix/Technical Assessment
- ASTM membership expected
- Alternate means of compliance may be acceptable to Director (CAA Issue Paper)
- Differences: low speed handling characteristics (loss of control) and icing
- Similarity – amendment comparison may not hold true

Cyber security



Aircraft Systems Information Security Protection (ASISP)

**FAA Policy Statement PS-AIR-21.16-02 r2
TC/STC Special Conditions for....**

**Systems with Major, Hazardous,
Catastrophic failure conditions:**

14 CFR 23 Level 4 Commuter Category

14 CFR 25 Transport Category

Systems with Hazardous, Catastrophic:

14 CFR 27 Multi-engine Normal Category

14 CFR 29 Transport Category

e.g. Garmin G5000 STC on Beech 400A

Aircraft Cybersecurity

EASA Decision 2020/006/R

**Rule change (interim TC/STC Special
Conditions) for....**

System failure criticality not specified:

CS-23 Level 4

CS-25

CS-27 Category A

CS-29

CS-E & CS-APU engine control systems

CS-ETSO, CS-P Propeller control systems

MoC: RTCA DO-365, EUROCAE ED-204

Note: ASTM F44 committee: Draft Standard Practice for Protection of Aircraft Systems from Intentional Unauthorized Electronic Interactions (IUEI) applies to Part 23 Level 1-4 Standard Category, Haz/Cat)



CPD

“We owe it to our passengers to keep learning how to do it better”



Chesley Sullenberger

- KU – online courses (Aircraft Structures, Icing, flight dynamics, EWIS, flight control & hydraulics, System Safety).
- Flight Safety – Human Factors, Gen Fam e.g. PT6, MEL, SMS.
- RTCA – DO-160, 178, 254
- SAE – Design for Manf, Design of Experiments, FEA, AS9100
- FAA – DER recurrency training
- ASTM – meetings on F44
- RAeS CPD sessions



CPD



Industry seminars	Date	Notes
AEA South Pacific conference (Qt)	10-11 Nov 2020	Postponed to 2021
UAS certification working group	Bi-annual	Likely online
ASTM F44 committee meeting	April/Oct	Likely free and online
ASTM F37 committee meeting		Likely free and online
JARUS Plenaries/WG6 meetings		Likely free and online
Fire & cabin safety triennial	Next event 2022	
FAA APAC bilateral partners meeting	Postponed to late 2021	
FAA Rotorcraft safety seminar	<u>27-Oct-20</u>	Online, free
EASA additive manufacturing	tbc	Online, free?
EASA rotorcraft symposium	<u>Nov-20</u>	Online, free.
FAA UAS symposium		
Drone enable (ICAO)	Mar-21	Live free on youtube
Uber elevate	June 21 tbc?	

Looking forward

- AC21-X Flight Test Guidance (imminent release)
- AC00-6 **Electronic signatures/recordkeeping/manuals** (released)
- AC21-7 Type Certification (wip)
- AC21-8 **Supplemental Type Certificates** (wip): Update PSCP template for Finding of Compliance.
- AC146-1 **Aircraft design organisations** (wip): Develop a clearer scope definition for Part 146 and DDH to ensure consistency and global alignment. Clarify delegation issue process. Clarify standalone FMS approvals. Remove 'negligible' W&B definition.
- AC43-14 Standard Design Changes (wip): Appendices for LED lights, AoA sensors, CO sensors, real time tracking systems e.g. Spidertracks.
- AC91-13 Night Vision Systems (wip): Clearer split between Ops & Airworthiness requirements. Clarity on Major/Minor for amendments to existing NVIS.

Hot topics

Continuing Airworthiness



- 1153 defect occurrences registered Oct 19 – Sept 20
- Nil registered by Part 146 or Part 148
- 32 related to NZ TC (raised by Maint Orgs, 1 by TC holder)
- One with keyword “STC” (raised by Maint Org with a DO)
- One with keyword “modification” and related to DO approval (raised by Maint Org)

12.55 - Notification of incident

(a) A holder of a certificate issued by the Director under the Act and the following Parts must notify the Authority as soon as practicable of any associated incident if the certificate holder is involved in the incident and the incident is a serious incident or is an immediate hazard to the safety of an aircraft operation:

- (1) Parts 115, 119, 129 and 137— aircraft incident, or dangerous goods incident:
- (2) Part 172 — airspace incident:
- (3) Parts 171 and 174 — facility malfunction incident:
- (4) Parts 19, 47, 115, 119, 129, 137, 145, 146, and 148 — defect incident:

Human Factors in Design



Clarity of Maintenance Instructions


- × “Installation is the reverse of removal”
- × “Make new hose in accordance with AC43.13-1b”

Different instructions for similar items – TC v’s STC/Mod

- ✓ Include IPC supplement if confusion could occur
- ✓ Consider the affect on or need for MMEL

The FAA provides a variety of material relating to human factors to help designers here:
https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/design_approvals/human_factors/hf-air/policy/
Design Considerations for the Human Contribution to Safety was presented at the 2019 Design Delegate Holders Seminar: <https://www.aviation.govt.nz/assets/aircraft/2019-design-delegation-seminar/design-considerations.pdf>

UAS approach




Complexity

Any single entry in the Complex Operation column cause the operation to be defined as Complex.

	Simple Operation		Complex Operation	
Weight of UA	Zero to 25kg	<input type="checkbox"/>	Greater than 25kg	<input type="checkbox"/>
Over People or Property	• With consent; or • with attempted consent (notified)	<input type="checkbox"/>	• Without consent; or • over crowds	<input type="checkbox"/>
Detect and Avoid	• VLOS; or • EVLOS	<input type="checkbox"/>	BVLOS	<input type="checkbox"/>
Level of Autonomy	The remote pilot has the ability to control or influence the flight path of the UA	<input type="checkbox"/>	The remote pilot does not have the ability to control or influence the flight path of the UA	<input type="checkbox"/>
Proximity to Air Traffic (altitude)	• Less than 400ft; or • operating within a Danger Area; or • greater than 4km from aerodrome in Class G airspace with an appropriate NOTAM	<input type="checkbox"/>	Greater than 400ft outside of the simple operation definition	<input type="checkbox"/>
Proximity to Air Traffic (aerodromes)	• Greater than 4km from aerodrome; or • less than 4km from aerodrome and shielded; or less than 4km from aerodrome with agreement/ATC authorisation and 101/61/149 qualification; or • less than 4km from aerodrome with radio and visual watch	<input type="checkbox"/>	Less than 4km from aerodrome outside of the simple operation definition	<input type="checkbox"/>
Meteorological Minima	• Day VMC; or • Night VMC shielded	<input type="checkbox"/>	• Night VMC un-shielded; or • Day/Night operations in IMC/BVLOS	<input type="checkbox"/>
Role	Operations minimising hazards to persons, property and other aircraft.	<input type="checkbox"/>	Carriage of dangerous goods; or passenger carrying	<input type="checkbox"/>


Risk



Certification

Level of Assurance (oversight) = declare/3rd party/TC


Level of Integrity (requirements) = OSO mapping. Standards: D&R, Industry Consensus, 14CFR, CS/SC-VTOL. No Integration solutions yet (Pt91 requirements – DAA, AI, ATS comms etc.)




Size	Applications in progress
0 – 25kg BVLOS	1 (medical delivery)
25 – 600kg	6 (infrastructure, survey, HALO, agriculture – all remote areas)
>600kg conversion	2 potential (both 14CFR 23 - STCs)
>600kg other	1



UAS approach




Break



DDH Q&A



We invite any questions, comments and/or feedback



Thank for you your attendance

